1b2ef28334
Implements docs/design-kanzlai-integration.md §8 Phase A. Schema (paliad.*): - users (extends auth.users) with office, practice_group, role - akten with visibility columns: owning_office, collaborators uuid[], firm_wide_visible (per design §2) - parteien, fristen, termine, dokumente, akten_events, notizen (polymorphic notes; notizen_exactly_one_parent CHECK) - proceeding_types, deadline_rules, holidays (reference data) - 4 feedback tables re-namespaced from public.* into paliad.* (handler swap to direct DB is a follow-up; old public tables stay intact for now and continue serving via PostgREST) Visibility (paliad.can_see_akte): - single SQL function, used by every RLS policy - predicate: firm_wide_visible OR owning_office matches user's office OR auth.uid() ∈ collaborators OR user is admin - mirrored at app layer in Phase B (defense in depth) RLS (real, not permissive): - akten: visibility predicate; insert restricted to own office or admin; delete restricted to partners + admins - parteien/fristen/dokumente/akten_events: inherit via can_see_akte(akte_id) - termine: personal (akte_id NULL) visible only to creator; Akte-linked follow visibility predicate - notizen: paliad.notiz_is_visible() resolves polymorphic parent - reference tables: SELECT for any authenticated user - users: SELECT all; UPDATE/INSERT only self - feedback tables: INSERT for any authenticated user (write-only) Seed data (ported from KanzlAI seed_upc_timeline.sql): - 7 proceeding_types (INF, REV, CCR, APM, APP, AMD, ZPO_CIVIL) - 40 deadline_rules (32 UPC + 4 ZPO + 4 cross-type appeal spawns) including conditional logic: Reply rule code (RoP.029b → 029a) and Rejoinder duration (1mo → 2mo) flip when CCR active - 55 holidays (DE federal 2026/2027 + UPC summer 2026 + UPC winter 26/27) Indexes per audit §3.3 + visibility-predicate hot paths: - akten: (status, owning_office), (owning_office), partial on firm_wide_visible, GIN on collaborators - fristen: (status, due_date), (akte_id) - termine: (start_at), (akte_id) - akten_events: (akte_id, created_at DESC) - notizen: 4 partial indexes per parent type - users: (office), (role) Migration tooling: - golang-migrate/migrate/v4 with embed.FS source - Migrations live in internal/db/migrations/ (Go embed can't reach outside the package; this is the conventional Go layout for embedded migrations) - Applied at server startup before HTTP listener binds - DATABASE_URL is optional today (existing knowledge tools work without DB); becomes required once Phase B services land - Mock Supabase auth schema for local testing in internal/db/migrations/_dev/mock_supabase_auth.sql (excluded from embed pattern by the underscore prefix) Other changes: - Dockerfile: bump golang to 1.24, copy go.sum (audit §2.9), rename binary patholo → paliad - docker-compose.yml: add DATABASE_URL passthrough - README.md: rewritten to reflect Paliad brand + Phase A migration system Verified locally: - 11 migrations applied cleanly against postgres:16-alpine - RLS enabled on all 15 paliad.* tables (verified via pg_class.relrowsecurity) - Visibility predicate verified with 4-case scenario: - Alice (Munich associate): sees Munich + firm-wide + collab-on (t f t t) - Bob (Düsseldorf associate): sees Düsseldorf + firm-wide + collab-on (f t t t) - Carol (Munich partner): sees Munich + firm-wide only (t f t f) - Anonymous: sees firm-wide only (f f t f) - migrate down + re-up cycle clean (initial 007 down had ordering bug, fixed: drop policies before referenced function) - Existing endpoints (/, /login) return 302 + 200 — no regressions
40 lines
1.3 KiB
PL/PgSQL
40 lines
1.3 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- Phase A: paliad.can_see_akte(akte_id) — single source of truth for
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-- office-scoped Akten visibility (design §2).
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--
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-- A user can see an Akte iff ANY of:
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-- - the Akte is flagged firm_wide_visible
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-- - the Akte's owning_office matches the user's office
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-- - the user's uuid appears in the Akte's collaborators array
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-- - the user has role = 'admin'
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--
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-- Used by every RLS policy (migration 007) and mirrored at the application
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-- layer (Phase B AkteService.ListVisibleForUser) for defense in depth.
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--
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-- SECURITY DEFINER so the function can read paliad.users regardless of the
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-- caller's own RLS grants. The function itself enforces the identity check
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-- by keying off auth.uid().
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION paliad.can_see_akte(_akte_id uuid)
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RETURNS boolean
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LANGUAGE sql
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STABLE
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = paliad, public
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AS $$
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SELECT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1
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FROM paliad.akten a
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LEFT JOIN paliad.users u ON u.id = auth.uid()
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WHERE a.id = _akte_id
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AND (
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a.firm_wide_visible
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OR (u.office IS NOT NULL AND a.owning_office = u.office)
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OR auth.uid() = ANY (a.collaborators)
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OR (u.role = 'admin')
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)
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);
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$$;
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COMMENT ON FUNCTION paliad.can_see_akte(uuid) IS
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'Office-scoped visibility predicate for paliad.akten. Called from RLS policies.';
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