Bundle of small audit findings, all doc-only or dead-code:
- F-5: refresh stale escalation-contact comment in models.User —
Settings UI dropdown shipped 2026-04-29 (t-paliad-066).
- F-10: add "OBSOLETED by migration 018" note to migrations 004/005/006
so readers stop hunting for the live shape in obsolete files.
- F-11: document the data-loss semantics of dropping
paliad.partner_unit_events on the 027 down — audit rows are
append-only telemetry, accepted loss on rollback.
- F-15: drop the patholo_session / patholo_refresh cookie fallback
added during the 2026-04-16 rebrand. Active users have long since
been re-authed through the upgrade path; inactive users hit the
normal /login flow.
- F-16: refresh stale /api/departments comment in team_pages.go to
/api/partner-units (renamed in t-paliad-070).
- F-17: move internal/db/migrations/_dev/mock_supabase_auth.sql to
internal/db/devtools/ so a future loosening of the //go:embed
pattern can't accidentally ship the dev-only fixture.
- F-18: update docs/project-status.md "Audit polish-2" entry — the
batch shipped via t-paliad-067 / 068 / 073, follow-ups are now
tracked under the 2026-04-30 re-audit + t-paliad-074.
go build / vet / test clean.
Three items from docs/improvement-audit.md §2:
I-5 Verlauf pagination
- AkteService.ListEvents now accepts a (before *uuid.UUID, limit int) cursor
- SQL uses a composite (created_at, id) cursor subquery — stable across
rows written in the same microsecond
- Handler parses ?before=<uuid>&limit=<n>, service clamps to 200
- Frontend fetches first page (50) on init and exposes a "Mehr laden" /
"Load more" button that keeps paging until the tail returns < page size
- i18n keys akten.detail.verlauf.loadMore / .loadingMore in DE + EN
I-8 patholo → paliad client-side rename with migrations
- i18n.ts: STORAGE_KEY is now paliad-lang; one-shot migration reads the
old patholo-lang value, writes the new key, deletes the old
- sidebar.ts: same pattern for paliad-sidebar-pinned
- Cookie rename with dual-read grace period: SessionCookieName is
paliad_session, LegacySessionCookieName keeps patholo_session as
read-only fallback. Requests using the legacy cookie get upgraded to
paliad_session in the response; legacy cookie is expired in the same
response. ClearAuthCookies clears both names to prevent stale-cookie
resurrection. Remove the legacy fallback after 2026-05-18 (30d cookie
max age).
- handlers/links.go:extractEmailFromCookie reads either cookie name via
auth.SessionCookieName / auth.LegacySessionCookieName
P-6 Single source of truth for offices
- New internal/offices package: Office struct + All + IsValid + Keys
- akte_service.go switched from inline isValidOffice to offices.IsValid
- GET /api/offices returns the list with DE + EN labels
- Akte create form (akten-neu.tsx) has an empty <select>; the client TS
fetches /api/offices and populates options, re-rendering on lang change
Tests:
- internal/offices/offices_test.go covers IsValid + Keys + label coverage
- internal/auth: three new Middleware tests — legacy cookie still
authenticates + upgrades the browser, new cookie wins when both are
present (no clobber), missing cookie returns 401 on API paths
Build: go build ./... + go vet ./... + go test ./... + bun run build all clean.
Known out-of-scope: handlers/links.go still POSTs to public.patholo_link_*
via PostgREST; migration 011 created fresh paliad.link_* tables but the
handler refactor (move to direct DB, copy data, drop public tables) is a
separate phase documented in that migration's header.
C-1. Session JWT signature verification (authZ bypass fix)
- Add SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET env var; fail-fast at startup if unset.
- auth.Client.VerifyToken uses github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 to verify
HS256 signatures, reject alg=none, enforce exp/nbf/iat.
- Middleware stores verified claims in request context; WithUserID
reads only verified claims (no more raw-cookie sub decoding).
- API requests get 401 on missing/invalid token (was 302 redirect).
- Refresh flow only runs on expiry; other signature failures reject
outright and clear cookies.
C-2. Dashboard Termine cross-user privacy leak
- dashboard_service.loadUpcomingAppointments now mirrors
TerminService.canSee: personal Termine (akte_id IS NULL) are
creator-only; admins do NOT see other users' personal Termine.
C-3. Role gate on Parteien + Termine mutations
- ParteienService.Delete now partner/admin only (matches FristService).
- TerminService.Update / Delete on Akte-linked Termine now require
partner/admin (or the original creator). Personal Termine stay
creator-only.
C-4. Email gate → ALLOWED_EMAIL_DOMAINS whitelist
- isHoganLovellsEmail → isAllowedEmailDomain reading the env var
(default: hoganlovells.com,hlc.com,hlc.de). Case-insensitive,
whitespace-tolerant.
- login.tsx placeholder: name@hoganlovells.com → name@hlc.com
- Error strings + login.hint (de/en) rewritten for HLC branding.
C-5. Docker compose env wiring
- docker-compose.yml gains SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET, CALDAV_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
and ALLOWED_EMAIL_DOMAINS passthrough; commented-out
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY line for Phase H readiness.
Tests
- auth_test.go: valid/wrong-secret/expired/alg-none/missing-sub/garbage
token cases for VerifyToken.
- handlers/auth_test.go: default + env-override cases for the email
whitelist.
- go build ./..., go vet ./..., go test ./... all clean.
