diff --git a/internal/services/paliadin_jwt.go b/internal/services/paliadin_jwt.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ef94dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/services/paliadin_jwt.go
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package services
+
+// Per-turn supabase JWT minting for Paliadin (t-paliad-156, folded into
+// t-paliad-194 / m/paliad#38 Phase B).
+//
+// Each Paliadin turn carries a short-lived JWT scoped to the calling
+// user. The JWT is signed with paliad's existing SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET so
+// it has the same shape Supabase Auth itself issues — same claims, same
+// signature, same role. The aichat backend writes it to a per-turn file
+// the claude pane reads to `SET LOCAL request.jwt.claims = …` before
+// every paliad.* query, which makes RLS evaluate as the user.
+//
+// TTL: short (default 2 min) — long enough to cover the persona's 120 s
+// run-turn budget plus generous slack for queueing, short enough that a
+// leaked JWT is uninteresting. Each turn mints fresh; nothing is cached.
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+)
+
+// ErrJWTSecretMissing signals that mintTurnJWT was called without the
+// SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET configured. paliad's auth layer fails fast on the
+// same condition at boot, but the per-turn mint path is reachable from
+// tests + the disabled stub, so we surface a typed error rather than
+// panicking.
+var ErrJWTSecretMissing = errors.New("paliadin: SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET not configured")
+
+// DefaultPaliadinJWTTTL is the JWT lifetime when the caller doesn't
+// override. 2 minutes covers aichat's 120 s persona timeout plus a few
+// seconds of buffer for HTTP overhead and clock skew.
+const DefaultPaliadinJWTTTL = 2 * time.Minute
+
+// mintTurnJWT signs a Supabase-shaped access token for the given user.
+// Claims:
+//
+//	sub  : userID — RLS reads this via auth.uid()
+//	role : "authenticated" — required so SET LOCAL ROLE matches
+//	aud  : "authenticated" — Supabase convention
+//	iss  : "paliad/paliadin" — distinguishes from real GoTrue tokens in
+//	       audit traces; not validated by RLS
+//	iat  : now
+//	exp  : now + ttl
+//
+// Signed HS256 with SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET (same secret paliad already
+// verifies session cookies against in internal/auth.Client). The
+// returned string is a standard 3-segment JWT.
+func mintTurnJWT(userID uuid.UUID, ttl time.Duration, secret []byte) (string, error) {
+	if len(secret) == 0 {
+		return "", ErrJWTSecretMissing
+	}
+	if ttl <= 0 {
+		ttl = DefaultPaliadinJWTTTL
+	}
+	now := time.Now()
+	claims := jwt.MapClaims{
+		"sub":  userID.String(),
+		"role": "authenticated",
+		"aud":  "authenticated",
+		"iss":  "paliad/paliadin",
+		"iat":  now.Unix(),
+		"exp":  now.Add(ttl).Unix(),
+	}
+	tok := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
+	signed, err := tok.SignedString(secret)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("paliadin: sign turn JWT: %w", err)
+	}
+	return signed, nil
+}